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PAIN AND SUFFERING




The current process for measuring pain and suffering damages
fails to serve the compensation and the accident avoidance goals
of tort law. The lack of standards for juries to apply produces
widely varying pain and suffering awards that leave observers
wondering what differences in the cases justify the disparity.
Disparate awards send confused signals concerning the appropri-
ate levels of accident avoidance. Overdeterrence of socially pro-
ductive activities and subsidization of socially undesirable activi-
ties are the unfortunate results.
This Note argues that adapting the criminal sentencing guide-
lines systems in use in several states1 to the personal injury con-
text would provide appropriate standards for measuring pain
and suffering damages. Part I explores why present methods for
measuring pain and suffering are objectionable. A description of
the proposed method for developing guidelines is provided in
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1. At least ten states have adopted sentencing guidelines systems: Florida, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah,
and Washington. Four other states, Nebraska, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin
have studied the possibility of adopting guidelines. J. HAWES, DEVELOPMENT OF SENTENC-
ING GUIDELINES AND IMPACT ON PLEA NEGOTIATIONS (National Center for State Courts,
Reference No. RIS 84.007) (1984) [hereinafter HAWES].
See generally S. SHANE-DUBow, A. BROWN & E. OLSON, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE
UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT AND EFFECT (1985). Congress authorized sentencing
guidelines as part of the Crime Control Act of 1984. The Federal Sentencing Guideline
Commission promulgated the guidelines in the fall of 1987 and the guidelines took effect
as of November 1, 1987. Block & Rhodes, The Impact of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE REPORTS (No. 205) (1987). The Supreme Court recently
upheld the validity of federal sentencing guidelines. Mistretta v. United States, 57
U.S.L.W. 4102 (U.S.Mo. Jan. 18, 1989) (No. 87-7028).
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Part II. Part II explores the use of guidelines in criminal sen-
tencing and the analogy between sentencing decisions and as-
sessment of damages for nonpecuniary loss. Part II also de-
scribes how to develop and implement guidelines for assessing
pain and suffering damages. Part III examines why the proposed
guidelines are a solution to the problems identified in Part I.
Finally, Part IV responds to possible criticisms of the proposed
reform.
I. PAIN AND SUFFERING ANOMIE: AN ABSENCE OF NORMS
Many tort reform proposals and commentaries focus on pain
and suffering damages. Some commentators call for the elimina-
tion of pain and suffering damages altogether.2 Others suggest
limiting recovery for pain and suffering losses to the pecuniary
manifestations of those losses.3 Several states have enacted legis-
lative limitations, or caps, on pain and suffering recoveries.4
Despite the push for reform of pain and suffering damages,
proposals to eliminate them, rather than merely limit them,
have not been adopted. Pain and suffering damages are the driv-
ing force behind most personal injury litigation5 and "will likely
2. O'Connell, A Proposal to Abolish Defendants' Payment for Pain and Suffering in
Return for Payment of Claimants' Attorneys' Fees, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 333.
3. Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
772, 809-10 (1985); Morris, Liability for Pain and Suffering, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 476, 476-
477 (1959).
4. E.g., Act of June 10, 1986, ch. 139, 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws (to be codified as
ALASKA STAT. § 09.17010 (1986)); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.80 (West Supp. 1987), but see
Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (holding unconstitutional a
$450,000 cap on noneconomic damages); MD. CTS. & Jun. PROC. CODE ANN § 11-108
(Supp. 1987); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.1483 (West Supp. 1988) (limitation applies
only to medical malpractice suits); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d (Supp. 1988); Act of
April 4, 1986, ch. 305, 1986 Wash. Laws (to be codified as WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24
(1987).
5. The prospect of obtaining pain and suffering damages is a major dynamic in per-
sonal injury litigation. Pain and suffering damages often eclipse other types of damage
awards. They also provide an incentive to bring suits which otherwise would not be
brought. Research and industry settlement practices have shown that recovery for pain
and suffering comprises the lion's share of all recovery for personal injuries. O'Connell &
Simon, Payment for Pain and Suffering: Who Wants What, When & Why?, 1972 U. ILL.
L.F. 1, 9-10; see also JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., HOW TO USE THE PERSONAL INJURY
VALUATION HANDBOOKS TO EVALUATE PERSONAL INJURY CASES 8 (1987) (indicating that
special damages (medical expenses and lost earnings) are exceeded by general damages
(pain and suffering and lost future earning capacity) by up to a factor of 10).
Commentators have suggested that pain and suffering damages are a clumsy substitute
for attorney's fees. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury, 18 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 219,
234-35 (1953); Morris, supra note 3, at 477; O'Connell, supra note 2, at 351. If pain and
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continue to dominate the personal injury recovery." The proper
allocation of pain and suffering damages is thus the area of tort
law in which reform is most necessary. To accomplish proper al-
location of pain and suffering damages, one first must determine
why the present system fails to fulfill the goals of tort law.
A. Poor Compensation, Inequitable Allocation, and
Inefficient Accident Avoidance
Compensation has long been a primary goal of tort law.' The
meaning of just or proper compensation differs when applied to
pain and suffering damages than to other items of damage recog-
nized by tort law. Just compensation in the context of pain and
suffering represents society's measurement of the gravity of
plaintiffs' physical pain and accompanying mental suffering at-
tributable to the wrongfully inflicted injury.
The standard measure of just compensation in personal injury
cases is the amount necessary to place the injured party in the
position that would have been obtained had the wrong not been
committed.8 A plaintiff's recovery ordinarily consists of two
components: economic damages and noneconomic damages. Eco-
nomic damages may consist of medical expenses, lost wages, and
lost earning capacity.9 Noneconomic damages consist primarily
of plaintiff's pain and suffering, and damages for the fear of
death associated with shortened life expectancy caused by the
injury in some cases. In certain circumstances, a plaintiff may
also recover punitive damages. 10
Restoration of the status quo ante, the professed goal of tort
compensation, cannot provide a basis for pain and suffering
damages. Almost by definition, money awarded for pain and
mental anguish can do little to alleviate the condition of suffer-
ing. As one professor has noted: "damages for pain and suffering
are not compensation in any ordinary sense . . . ." Several
commentators have gone as far as to suggest that pain and suf-
suffering damages are a substitute for attorneys' fees, then the prospect of pain and suf-
fering damages invites suits which would not otherwise be brought.
6. D. DOBBS, REMEDIES, § 8.1, at 551 (1973).
7. Ingber, supra note 3, at 775.
8. D. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 8.1, at 540.
9. Id.
10. Id. § 3.9.
11. Id. § 8.1, at 545.
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fering damages serve no compensatory function. 2 Instead, these
damages are economically inefficient because they create two
losses where only one existed previously. Plaintiff continues to
experience pain, and the defendant experiences economic loss as
well.' 3 It has also been suggested that the true function of pain
and suffering damages is as a source for financing the costs of
litigation. " The most defensible compensatory function of pain
and suffering damages is that they provide solace to the victim
by according public recognition to the degree of emotional and
physical indignity associated with wrongfully inflicted injury. 5
This formulation of the compensatory function of pain and
suffering damages emphasizes the normative aspect of assessing
pain and suffering damages. The question presented when deter-
mining compensation is less factual than normative. Given a
wrongfully inflicted injury, to what extent and in what fashion
should the law take account of the resulting human suffering?
The jury's answers to the normative questions implicate value
and policy choices more than most cases of damage assessment;
therefore, the standards for assessment should be influenced to a
greater extent by concerns of public policy and consistency. The
focus of inquiry is less upon the degree of plaintiff's pain as a
result of injury (as would be the case if money could serve as a
substitute for pain and suffering loss) and more upon the
amount that is necessary to indicate society's view of the gravity
of the pain and indignity associated with the injury inflicted.'"
12. Ingber, supra note 3, at 775-86; Jaffe, supra note 5, at 221-27; Morris, supra note
3, at 477-78.
13. Ingber, supra note 3, at 780.
14. D. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 8.1 at 550-51.
15. P. ATIYAH, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION AND THE LAW, 537 (3d ed. 1980); D. DOBBS,
supra note 6, § 8.1, at 550; Jaffe, supra note 5, at 224.
16. The focus on social perception of plaintiff's suffering, rather than plaintiff's per-
ception, flows from the objective nature of defendant's liability. The use of an objective
measure for pain and suffering damages is consistent with the treatment accorded all
other types of tort damage. Damages are measured according to liability rules as opposed
to property rules. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Under a liability
rule the value of an item is determined by the value attached to it by the law's "reasona-
ble person." A property rule measures recovery according to subjective valuation of the
party. Conceptual difficulty accompanies items of damage, such as pain and suffering,
where the difference between the application of property rules and liability rules is ob-
scured by the absence of a market for the item of damage. Where a market does not
exist, the amount the plaintiff would demand to part with an item (the subjective mea-
sure contemplated by a property rule) is very often the most probative evidence of what
the item is worth objectively (the damages allowed under a liability rule). Even in these
cases, the proper measure of damages is the objective measure. The fact that a violinist
would accept no amount of money to part with the last Stradivarius is of no legal conse-
quence. The violin's uniqueness, however, will affect the price others would be willing to
[VOL. 22:2
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The present process for measuring pain and suffering damages
does not establish properly the social value of the mental
anguish suffered by a plaintiff. The process is capricious and in-
equitable, often providing the least injured with windfall recov-
eries, while leaving the most seriously injured far short of even a
minimally appropriate award. 7 Presently, pain and suffering
awards say little about the degree of plaintiff's suffering or how
society values it. The message is so muddled that the award has
scarcely any meaning at all.
The failure to compensate properly for dignatory injuries may
be attributed to the difficulties of "evaluating the impondera-
ble."'" Although jurors may be motivated by shared values, the
translation of those values into consistent monetary awards is
befuddled by their differing conceptions of the value of money.
In most instances of tort loss, the nexus between the dollar
amount awarded as damages and the value of plaintiff's actual
loss is provided by the market. If plaintiff's automobile is de-
stroyed, the market value of that vehicle determines the mea-
sure of recovery.' 9 Similarly, when plaintiff suffers personal in-
jury, a market provides guidance for her recovery.20 The basis
for reliance on the market mechanism is that it provides an im-
partial and objective measure of the value that society places on
a particular item of damage. When a jury, as fact finder, departs
radically from the market measure, where the appropriate mar-
ket is plain, it is suspected of acting upon unknowable biases or
prejudices.
pay for it. Similarly, it is not how one individual values suffering endured that matters,
but how society as a whole would value that suffering.
17. J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY 35 (1971), cited in O'Connell & Simon,
supra note 5, at 7.
18. Jaffe, supra note 5, at 224.
19. See D. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 5.10, at 375. The use of the market measure is
complicated by the need to select a market when the relevant market does not exist at
the place where the property was damaged or destroyed. It is also made more complex
by the need to take depreciation into account for cases where property is damaged but
not destroyed; see also United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 899 (1958).
20. The reasonable value of doctors' services, the medication, and the cost of hospi-
talization generally would be measured by the price charged for these services. D. DOBsS,
supra note 6, § 8.1, at 543. Similarly, the value of wages lost while recuperating is medi-
ated by the market in the sense that the wage for the particular form of labor is deter-
mined by the forces of supply and demand.
Lost earning capacity, or lost future earnings, present a more complicated problem.
The appropriate measure of damages, however, is still provided by the market for plain-
tiff's form of labor. D. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 8.1, at 541. The difficulty occurs in divining
the type of job, and thus the wage, plaintiff would have had absent injury.
WINTER 19891
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No market for pain and suffering exists because a market is
composed of willing buyers and sellers and very few persons vol-
untarily endure pain and suffering for a price. The failure to
compensate properly is attributable to the lack of a market, and
thus a lack of norms, for measuring pain and suffering. As Pro-
fessor Ingber has noted:
[W]ithout some basis for calculating loss, damage
awards are apt in many cases to be unfair to one or the
other of the parties. But no such standards have been de-
veloped. Juries are left with nothing but their consciences
to guide them. Consequently, wide variations in mone-
tary awards result, and there remains the danger that ju-
ries may be responding to irrelevant or even illegitimate
distinctions in the cases.21
One professor has also charged that in design defect cases "ju-
ries are free to, and do with regularity, react purely out of
whim. '2 2 A plaintiff's lawyer suggests that when considering a
demand for pain and suffering damages lawyers should "just
pluck a figure out of the sky and hope it's high enough. '23
Similarly, the absence of norms for pain and suffering mea-
surement fosters arbitrary awards in the context of negotiated
settlements. To determine the pain and suffering component of
a settlement, the parties typically employ a rule of thumb based
on the claimant's medical bills. Insurers will pay three to ten
times plaintiff's medical expenses, depending upon the severity
of the injury, for pain and suffering. Awareness of this practice
has encouraged bill padding,2 4 which is particularly hard to de-
tect with minor injuries.2 5
The current process for measuring pain and suffering damages
impairs proper compensation, equitable allocation, and efficient
accident avoidance in part because jurors entertain differing
conceptions of the economic value of pain and suffering. In most
cases involving pecuniary losses, the jury determines the extent
21. Ingber, supra note 3, at 778-79.
22. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 558, 566 n.35 (1985)
(quoting Product Liability Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. for Consumers of the
Senate Comm. of Commerce, Science and Transportation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 22
(1982) (statement of J. Henderson).
23. Ingber, supra note 3, at 778 n.27 (citing Galante, When the Mind is Hurt, Nat'l
L. J., May 28, 1984, at 28, col. 2.).
24. Id. at 779; O'Connell & Simon, supra note 5, at 6. A startling example of bill
padding is reported in a series of articles in the Chicago Sun Times and quoted in
O'Connell, supra note 2, at 334-35.
25. O'Connell & Simon, supra note 5, at 6.
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of the loss and then applies the market value (with some flexibil-
ity) to those losses. In the case of pain and suffering damages,
however, the jury not only determines the extent of the loss, but
also the value of that loss. Because juries are guided by the par-
ticular values of its constituent members, different juries apply
different notions of the monetary value to assess pain and suf-
fering damages. Awards may vary because of the difficulty of ex-
pressing conceptions of the value of suffering in a consistent
way, not because the jury believed one plaintiff to have suffered
more.
For example, suppose that pain could be segregated into equal
units. Jury "1" determines that plaintiff "A" has suffered "X"
units of pain and is therefore entitled to "N" dollars. Jury "2"
concludes that plaintiff "B" also suffered "X" units of pain, but
instead of "N" dollars, it could give "2N" or "1/2 N" dollars be-
cause there is no shared idea of the monetary value of "X" units
of pain and suffering. This lack of consensus regarding the mon-
etary value of pain and suffering can be termed pain and suffer-
ing "anomie."26 All else held constant, one jury may value the
pain associated with loss of "A's" leg at $5,000, while another
may find the same harm to be worth $10,000.27 The results are
the skewed compensation patterns and distorted accident avoid-
ance signals described above.
The fact that differences in awards for pain and suffering can-
not be attributed confidently to actual differences in the merits
of a plaintiff's case raises equity considerations. Like cases
should be treated similarly, suggesting that awards should vary
only when real differences exist in the extent and severity of in-
jury. When variance is attributable to the biases and predilec-
tions of the decision maker, this principle is violated.
Pain and suffering anomie also undermines the accident
avoidance goal of tort law. Tort liability reduces accident-caus-
ing behavior by publicly indicating the types of conduct that will
be sanctioned and the severity of the sanction. The public, re-
26. Anomie means an absence of natural or legal organization. The term was used by
the French sociologist Emile Durkheim to describe social disorder caused by the break-
down in shared community values. See E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY
(1933). The term is used here to convey a sense of the disruption caused by the absence
of norms for determining pain and suffering damages.
27. Professor Patrick Atiyah recognizes this problem when he suggests that a diffi-
culty in awarding "full compensation" for pain and suffering is that the plaintiffs also
work with different conceptions of value. He writes: "To award £5,000 for a lost leg to a
wealthy man may seem derisory; a similar sum to a poor man may be untold riches." P.
ATIYAH, supra note 15, at 214 (1970); see also Ingber, supra note 3, at 778 n.27.
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acting to the threat of liability, takes care to avoid accident-
causing behavior.
A more sophisticated view of the deterrence function of tort
law emphasizes efficient allocation of accident costs."8 Tort law
does not seek to eliminate all accidents. Rather, its purpose is to
assure that each accident-causing activity bears the costs of the
accidents attributable to it. Market forces select the efficient
level of accident-producing activity. 9 To the extent that the ag-
gregate of damages awarded for a particular injury understates
or overstates the social consensus concerning the cost of that in-
jury, the activity producing the injury is subsidized or taxed
inefficiently.
A deterrence theory of accident law requires that amounts
awarded for a particular injury reflect social consensus concern-
ing the cost of that injury, including pain and suffering. If the
"price" signals sent by such awards are to have their intended
effect on behavior, the same price signal must be sent for similar
injuries. As suggested above, the present system for assessing
pain and suffering satisfies neither of these requirements.
Pain and suffering guidelines offer a uniform standard for val-
uing pain. The guidelines would inform juries of the value for
pain and suffering assigned by a large number of juries to inju-
ries similar to those before the factfinder. Although guidelines
based on the decisions of many juries would not replicate a mar-
ket for pain and suffering, it would have some of the advantages
of market pricing because of the greater number of persons par-
ticipating in the value assessment. The guidelines provide the
jury with a benchmark to focus on in determining whether the
circumstances of the case before it warrant departure from the
standard. Discretion is not taken away from the jury, but the
guidelines help the jury exercise its discretion in an informed
manner.
28. See generally, G. CALABRnsi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (presenting a frame-
work for evaluating systems of accident law).
29. The efficient level of accident-producing activity is influenced by the costs associ-
ated with accidents produced by that activity. Where an activity must bear the accident
costs it produces, including noneconomic costs such as pain and suffering, industry reve-
nues are reduced by the costs of accidents that it must pay for. Therefore, the industry
would be willing to spend the amount of revenues lost to accident costs to avoid future
accidents either by investing in accident avoidance technologies or by reducing
production.
The "price" attached to the pain and suffering endured by plaintiffs indicates, in part,
how much an industry should spend to avoid the injury. If accident avoidance is to be
efficient, the statement must reflect social consensus concerning the value of avoiding
particular injuries. Thus, efficient accident avoidance also requires objective measure-
ment of pain and suffering awards.
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II. PAIN AND SUFFERING GUIDELINES
This part provides a detailed explanation of the history of
guidelines, their development, and their function. The first part
explores the use of guidelines in criminal sentencing and early
evidence of success in reducing sentencing disparity. The simi-
larities between sentencing and pain and suffering damages
measurement suggest that a system styled after sentencing
guidelines is appropriate for measuring pain and suffering dam-
ages. The second part describes three steps necessary to develop
and use pain and suffering guidelines: initial research and pro-
mulgation, jury implementation, and data feedback.
A. The Criminal Sentencing Analog
The proposed method for developing schedules for pain and
suffering damages is drawn from a recent innovation in the field
of criminal sentencing-sentencing guidelines. The guidelines
arose from widespread concern, beginning in the late 1960s, over
sentencing disparity, the practice of sentencing offenders con-
victed of the same offense to different prison terms. Disparity
violates principles of horizontal equity and undermines confi-
dence in the justice system by making sentencing appear arbi-
trary.s Sentencing guidelines structure judicial discretion to
lessen the injustices of disparity while permitting judges to tailor
sentences to the needs of both the offender and society."s
To establish guidelines, most states create an administrative
agency, often referred to as the sentencing guidelines commis-
sion, to conduct initial research and to promulgate the guide-
lines. Once promulgated, the guidelines are distributed to sen-
tencing judges.
When applying the guidelines to actual cases the judge is per-
mitted to exercise discretion by choosing any sentence within
the guidelines, or in exceptional cases, by departing from the
30. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 8 (1973).
31. The guidelines usually consist of either a single matrix or a series of two axis
matrices. A score representing the seriousness of the offense is usually plotted along one
axis while a score representing the gravity of an offender's criminal history is plotted
along the other. At the intersection of the two points is the presumptive sentence. Pre-
sumptive sentences are indicated in ranges with roughly a 15 to 30 percent differential
between the minimum presumptive sentence and the maximum presumptive sentence.
For an illustration of state sentencing guidelines, see Appendix, Tables 1 and 2.
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guidelines. In cases in which the judge departs, he may be re-
quired to place his reasons for departure on the record.
An essential component of the guidelines is that particular
guidelines are not permanently established. The guidelines are
monitored and altered periodically to maintain the desired sen-
tencing policy. Usually, the guidelines commission is authorized
to conduct the monitoring and updating process.32
Sentencing guidelines have been successful in reducing sen-
tence disparity. For example, Minnesota, the first state to intro-
duce guidelines, reported that sentence uniformity in 1981, 1982,
and 1983 increased fifty-two percent, forty-four percent, and
thirty-eight percent respectively over preguidelines sentencing.3
Criminal sentencing reforms are transferable to the tort con-
text because criminal sentencing and pain and suffering damages
allocation have common attributes. Once liability is established,
the judge or jury has, without guidelines, virtually unlimited dis-
cretion because little objective information exists upon which to
32. Judges' departures are an essential part of the guidelines system. Recording de-
partures in the guidelines data base serves to fine tune the guidelines by correcting, over
time, any miscalculation or error made by the Commission in promulgating the guide-
lines. Additionally, the feedback system provides a convenient and efficient mechanism
for assuring that sentencing practices conform to changing perceptions of proper sen-
tencing policy as reflected by the decisions of the sitting trial judges. Finally, sentencing
guidelines contemplate that the appellate judiciary will be used to police the guidelines.
33. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF MINNESOTA SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES: THREE YEAR EVALUATION 34, 39, 41 (1984) [hereinafter MINNESOTA
GUIDELINES COMMISSION].
It should be noted that the Minnesota guidelines depended in large part upon a pre-
scriptive approach to guidelines development rather than the descriptive approach advo-
cated in this Note. See infra text accompanying notes 37-38.
The Minnesota Guidelines Commission adopted a prescriptive approach because a
purely descriptive approach would serve only to institutionalize the disparity-producing
practices that the Commission was trying to eliminate. Disparity in sentencing resulted
primarily from each judge sentencing on the basis of his own sentencing philosophy.
Some judges emphasized deterrence, others emphasized retribution, and still others em-
phasized rehabilitation. In many cases, these different philosophies call for vastly differ-
ent sentences, given the same offense and the same offender. A statistical description of
past sentences, therefore, would not reveal a sentencing policy. The Commission was
required to choose between competing sentencing philosophies. MINNESOTA GUIDELINES
COMMISSION, at 10-12. Telephone interview with Dr. Kay Knapp, Director of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines Commission Research Staff, formerly Director of the Min-
nesota Guidelines Commission Staff (Fall 1986).
In contrast to criminal sentencing, the theoretical bases for pain and suffering awards
are not incompatible with each other. The two principle bases are compensation and
efficient accident avoidance. Efficient accident avoidance is achieved when the award
equals the cost to plaintiff of the injury incurred, including an amount sufficient to rec-
ognize the gravity of his pain and suffering injury. See supra note 27 and accompanying
text (discussing the confusion regarding costs to the plaintiff). Setting damages for pain
and suffering, unlike fixing prison sentences, does not require a choice between compet-
ing remedial theories.
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base a decision. The criminal court is informed of an offender's
criminal history, the offense he committed, and the statutory
minimum and maximum sentences. Within the statutorily per-
mitted term, the trial judge is practically a law unto herself. 4
Similarly, the jury is given only minimal guidance in determin-
ing nonpecuniary damages;3 5 its decisions regarding damages
usually remain unreviewed by the appellate courts2 6 If guide-
lines are effective in reducing disparity in sentencing, they may
be effective in increasing uniformity in damage awards.
B. The Plan
The proposed guidelines approach has three phases: initial re-
search and promulgation, jury implementation, and data
feedback.
1. Initial research and promulgation-The initial research
and promulgation of the guidelines should occur under the di-
rection of an administrative agency, the pain and suffering dam-
ages guidelines commission (the commission), similar in function
to existing sentencing guidelines commissions. 37 The guidelines
commission must resolve two threshold problems before guide-
lines development can begin. First, the commission, or the legis-
lation authorizing the creation of guidelines for pain and suffer-
ing, must determine the methods to be used to develop
guidelines. The primary choice is whether to develop "descrip-
tive" or "prescriptive" guidelines. Second, the commission must
establish the categories upon which to base guidelines
development.
34. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 30, at 8-9. Limited appellate review of judicial sen-
tencing decisions is available in most states. The standard of review, however, is quite
narrow, usually a variant on the abuse of discretion standard. For instance, in People v.
Coles, 417 Mich. 523, 339 N.W.2d 440 (1983), the Michigan Supreme Court held that an
appellate court may grant sentencing relief only when it is convinced that the trial court
"abused its discretion to the extent that it shocks the conscience of the appellate court."
Id. at 550, 339 N.W.2d at 453.
35. Juries are instructed to provide "fair compensation" or a "reasonable amount."
See Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 95, 138 A.2d 713, 720 (1958); D. DoBBs, supra note 6,
§ 8.1 at 545 n.41; Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27,
30-31 (1955).
36. For a discussion of the reluctance of appellate courts to review damage awards,
see infra note 78.
37. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of previously established
sentencing guidelines commissions and how the composition of the commissions affect
their credibility, see Tonry, The Sentencing Commission in Sentencing Reform, 7 HOF-
STRA L. REV. 315 (1978).
WINTER 19891
Journal of Law Reform
Descriptive guidelines model existing practices. s The premise
is that through research of past cases, models can be designed to
predict the "average" result that would be reached in subse-
quent cases." Descriptive sentencing guidelines, therefore, pur-
port to represent the sentence typically imposed given a specific
crime and offender.4 0
Prescriptive guidelines are designed with particular policy
objectives in mind. The Minnesota sentencing guidelines are es-
sentially prescriptive.41 The Minnesota Commission's decision to
adopt retribution as the primary sentencing philosophy of its
guidelines is an example of an essentially prescriptive policy
choice made during guidelines development. 42 Moreover, the
Minnesota Commission was statutorily required to account for
the effect of any changes in sentencing policy upon overall
prison population and available jail space.' 3 The Pennsylvania
legislature required that guidelines increase penalties for offend-
ers with prior criminal histories or for offenders using deadly
weapons to commit their crimes." Similarly, prescriptive dam-
age award guidelines might emphasize the need to increase
awards for injuries presently thought to be undercompensated
and to decrease awards for injuries thought to be
overcompensated.'6
Pain and suffering damage guidelines should emphasize' 6 the
descriptive technique because the resulting guidelines will be
38. MINNESOTA GUIDELINES COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 8.
39. NATIONAL INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTUR-
ING JUDICIAL DISCRETION 10 (1978) [hereinafter SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING
JUDICIAL DISCRETION].
40. Id.
41. MINNESOTA GUIDELINES COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 8.
42. Id. at 9-10.
43. Id. at 7.
44. HAWES, supra note 1, at 12.
45. See generally sources cited supra note 15.
46. Most of the sentencing guidelines are neither wholly prescriptive nor wholly de-
scriptive of prior sentencing practices in their jurisdictions. Rather, the guidelines tend
both to describe and prescribe sentencing practices, with some guidelines emphasizing
description of past practices and others emphasizing prescription of desired changes. De-
scriptive guidelines contain prescriptive elements in that guidelines development begins
with assumptions made by the researchers that imply value choices. Moreover, the legis-
lature or the commission members may use the guidelines to prescribe changes in spe-
cific problem areas without abandoning the overall descriptive approach. Finally, even
descriptive guidelines tend to become prescriptive once they are placed in operation be-
cause they define how decisions should be made in the future. Conversely, even guide-
lines developed with emphasis on a prescriptive approach have employed some modeling
techniques associated with primarily descriptive guidelines. See MINNESOTA GUIDELINES
COMMISSION, supra note 33, at 9.
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more representative of community values than prescriptive
guidelines. The primary compensatory function of pain and suf-
fering damages is to express society's view of the gravity of the
dignatory harm wrongfully inflicted upon the victim. To the ex-
tent that the guidelines rely upon judgments made by actual ju-
rors as opposed to judgments made by legislators or guidelines
commission members, the guidelines will more likely reflect
community sentiment concerning the monetary value of particu-
lar pain and suffering injuries.
The potential disadvantages of descriptive guidelines are two-
fold. First, if existing practices are fundamentally flawed, de-
scriptive guidelines risk institutionalizing the flawed practices."7
Second, an underlying premise of descriptive guidelines is that
research will reveal coherent behavior patterns by the decision
makers. 8 If research reveals no pattern of behavior, then devel-
opment of descriptive guidelines would either be impossible or
the guidelines developed would have little descriptive power."9
A premise of this Note, and indeed of society's reliance upon
the jury system, is that juries respond coherently and consist-
ently to evidence of plaintiff's injury. This Note argues, however,
that the present incoherence of amounts awarded for pain and
suffering is attributable to the lack of standards for evaluating
pain and suffering.
Descriptive guidelines rely on multiple linear regression analy-
sis.50 Multiple Linear Regression Analysis is the process of iden-
tifying the relationship, in the form of an equation, which best
explains the variation in a dependent variable caused by manip-
ulation of independent variables.5 1
In sentencing guidelines, bivariate regression analysis is used
to determine which of many suspected factors, independent
variables, have a statistically relevant impact on the sentence
imposed. For instance, if it is thought that an offender's criminal
history influences judges' sentencing decisions, regression analy-
47. Id. at 8.
48. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION, supra note 39, at
7, 10.
49. See id.
50. Discussion of regression analysis and the Albany method of guidelines develop-
ment is intended only to identify a technique which may be useful in establishing a
better scheme for awarding pain and suffering damages. The discussion should not be
read to prescribe the specifics of how this technique will be applied to the task of pre-
dicting future jury behavior from past jury behavior. Designing the specific research plan
is a highly complex task which is well beyond the scope of this Note, and is best left to
econometricians, particularly those skilled in the field of forecasting.
51. L. SCHROEDER, D. SJOQUIST & P. STEPHANS, UNDERSTANDING REGRESSION ANALYSIS:
AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE 11-12, 29 (1986).
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sis based on data consisting of actual sentencing decisions is
used to determine the extent to which variation in offender's
criminal history produces changes in the sentence. Linear regres-
sion analysis is used to determine whether any of a number of
factors thought to be relevant exert a statistically significant in-
fluence on a judge's sentencing decision.
Multiple regression analysis attempts to determine the rela-
tive importance of each factor to the sentencing decision while
identifying the group of quantifiable factors that best accounts
for or explains the sentence imposed. Based on observation of
the relationship among the factors, researchers use these rela-
tionships to predict future behavior of judges. Guidelines then
may be issued expressing predictions that will inform judges of
the central tendencies in sentencing of numerous judges given a
particular set of facts.2
Assuming that a descriptive approach is feasible, initial re-
search, development, and promulgation of pain and suffering
awards guidelines will occur along lines similar to those pursued
by the researchers who conducted the initial feasibility study for
sentencing guidelines.53 In the initial stage of guidelines develop-
ment, the commission compiles a catalogue of the factors be-
lieved to be most influential in determining pain and suffering
awards. 1 Records from litigated personal injury suits are ex-
52. See generally SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION, supra
note 39.
53. Id. The descriptive method of developing guidelines is also called, after these re-
searchers, the "Albany Approach." MINNESOTA GUIDELINES COMMISSION, supra note 33, at
8.
54. In their initial guidelines project, the Albany researchers compiled the catalogue
of factors from the legal and social science literature and from the input of trial judges.
Ultimately, the catalogue consisted of 205 suspected factors. Researchers developing the
Florida sentencing guidelines tested 220 factors, and those developing Michigan's guide-
lines tested 400 factors. HAWES, supra note 1, at 6, 24. The Albany researchers reviewed
400 previous sentencing decisions for the catalogued factors. Multiple regression analysis
was used to determine the weight of the factors. Guidelines were then developed accord-
ing to this research. See SENTENCING GUIDELINES: STRUCTURING JUDICIAL DISCRETION,
supra note 39 at xiv.
The Albany researchers posited that their research would reveal a pattern in judicial
decision making. They discovered that a handful of factors such as the severity of the
offense and the offender's prior record accounted for a significant portion of the variation
in sentences. Id. at 26-27.
It is conceivable that research will reveal no such pattern with respect to jury decisions
concerning pain and suffering damages. If this were the case, little could be gained from
formulating the guidelines according to the Albany technique.
The absence of a pattern would indicate that awards for pain and suffering are heavily
dependent upon the random biases of the jurors in a given case. Equitable considera-
tions, as well as considerations of efficient accident avoidance, suggest that if the Albany
technique fails, either prescriptive guidelines or legislatively enacted base figures should
be employed. Such guidelines may be less representative of community values concern-
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amined for the presence or absence of suspected factors.5 5 The
researchers identify the suspected factors that, in fact, had a sta-
tistically relevant influence on pain and suffering awards.
Factors found to be statistically relevant are analyzed to de-
termine the relative weight of each factor on the amount
awarded. Once the relative weight of each factor is determined,
researchers combine this knowledge with their knowledge of
amounts previously awarded to predict the dollar amount that a
typical jury would award for a particular category of pain and
suffering injury. These models can then be used to formulate
guidelines to inform future juries of the amount that the typical
jury is likely to award in a given fact situation.
The creation of pain and suffering guidelines requires the defi-
nition of the categories of injuries. Defining the categories
presents political, philosophical, and policy choices rather than
issues for statistical analysis.
The difficulties attending categorization can be illustrated by
considering pain and suffering damages for hand and leg inju-
ries. Should separate guidelines be developed for arms and legs,
or should there be a single set of guidelines for appendages? If
separate guidelines are developed for arms and legs, should sep-
arate guidelines for hands and fingers or feet and toes be
promulgated? Perhaps an equally defensible arrangement might
be to treat fingers and toes as one category, hands and feet as a
second, and injury to the whole arm or leg as a third. Statistical
research may be helpful in determining general trends, but is
unlikely to be conclusive. Thus, either the legislature or, more
ing pain and suffering loss than the Albany guidelines, but they would be an improve-
ment over essentially arbitrary decisions.
55. Data collection is prone to be somewhat more complicated for civil damages than
for criminal sentencing. One problem results from the use of lump sum verdicts. Re-
searchers encountering lump sum verdicts will be unable to determine which portion of
the verdict was attributable to pain and suffering.
This problem can be remedied, however, by requiring juries to indicate the amount
awarded for pain and suffering. Some jurisdictions, particularly those employing caps on
noneconomic loss, now require juries to identify the amount awarded for non-economic
loss. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-109 (Supp. 1988); MIcH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 600.1483 (West Supp. 1988); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 508:4-d (Supp. 1988).
A potentially more difficult problem lies in the data collection stage. In developing
sentencing guidelines, researchers could review pre-sentencing reports for the presence or
absence of the catalogued factors. Juries, however, are rarely required to reveal the fac-
tors that influenced their decisions.
One possible solution is to question jurors after they have rendered their verdict. Each
juror could be asked to fill out a confidential and anonymous questionaire. The research-
ers could then cull the information supplied by individual jurors and compile a summary
that represents the jury's decision.
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likely, the guidelines commission will have to decide these
questions.
The categories chosen will influence the presumptive awards
even with purely descriptive guidelines because research may re-
veal one presumptive award if the category is appendages and
another if arms and legs are treated separately. The implications
of this fact are twofold. First, to the extent that the guidelines
reflect community values, they do so given the categories defined
in the guidelines. The second implication, which follows from
the first, is that the guidelines will tend to define community
standards as much as they tend to reflect them. This is no more
or less desirable in guidelines than in other legislation, all of
which tends to exert similar pressures on social mores. Not in-
frequently, latent community values are finally recognized dur-
ing the process of debating proposed legislation.
2. Jury implementation- Once liability is established, the
jury should be instructed to consult the guidelines and deter-
mine which cell, within the appropriate matrix,56 best describes
the case before it.5 7 The jury should be informed that the dollar
figure listed at that point represents the presumptive award. If
the jury determines that the best match possible under the grid
inadequately describes the case before it, it should consider de-
parting from the presumptive award in either direction. Because
departures are important to the "fine-tuning" of the guidelines,
it is important, at least initially, that juries be allowed to depart
from the guidelines at will.
3. Data feedback- All jury verdicts and decisions concern-
ing awards for nonpecuniary damages should be recorded by the
guidelines commission. This information can be fed into the
data base and new guidelines would be issued periodically to re-
flect changes in juries' consensuses concerning presumptive
awards.
Over time, this feedback process should result in presumptive
awards that reflect closely jury sentiment on the appropriate
award for a particular loss. When the juries' determination of
the appropriate award for a type of injury becomes sufficiently
56. The description provided here presumes that pain and suffering guidelines, like
criminal sentencing guidelines, will take shape in the form of matrices. There is no rea-
son why pain and suffering guidelines could not take shape in some other way.
57. The guidelines provide a means of comparing the case at hand with those that
preceded it. The combination of factors listed on the x and y axis for each cell describes
the attributes of the previous cases. The jury is asked to score the guidelines grid by
looking at the appropriate matrix and by comparing the factors describing the matrix to
the factors present in the actual case before it. The jury determines the presumptive
award by deciding which matrix cell best describes the attributes of the case before it.
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particularized, it takes on attributes of law. It then would be ap-
propriate for the judiciary to police the standard.
Once a jury determined that a particular grid cell best de-
scribed the case before it, a presumption would arise that the
cell adequately describes the case before the jury. The trial
judge would have the authority to order remittitur, additur, or a
new trial on damages based on the jury's improper departure
from the presumptive award.
III. THE ARTICULATION OF NORMS FOR DAMAGE MEASUREMENT
Pain and suffering guidelines promote more uniform awards,
further appropriate compensation, and increase efficient acci-
dent avoidance. They also have the potential to better achieve
both the compensation and the deterrence goals of the tort law
because the scheduled awards will more nearly approximate a
consensus on the appropriate objective measure of a particular
pain and suffering loss. Moreover, the guidelines are sufficiently
flexible to allow the parties to receive personalized justice.
A. More Uniform Awards
Pain and suffering guidelines provide for more uniform jury
verdicts. The importance of uniformity is twofold. First, uniform
awards for pain and suffering damages promote internal consis-
tency. If some, or perhaps most, of the variations in awards for
apparently similar injuries cannot be attributed confidently to
actual differences in the severity of the victim's pain and suffer-
ing injury, then it is more equitable to emphasize consistency
and proportionality over individualized justice. As stated by
Professor Patrick Atiyah:
If we cannot say what a leg or an arm is worth [in
terms of pain and suffering], we can at least say that a
leg today is worth the same as a leg tomorrow, and we
can also say that an arm must be worth more than a
hand .... 58
58. P. ATIYAH, supra note 15, at 215.
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Second, uniformity increases predictability, which in turn facili-
tates negotiated settlements. 9
The advantages of uniformity have led some commentators to
favor legislatively enacted schedules for pain and suffering."0
Professor Atiyah, a British commentator, notes that English
judges, who are charged with fixing pain and suffering awards,
have begun to employ an informal tariff for assessing such
damages."1
B. Compensation and Accident Avoidance
Guidelines will improve compensation for pain and suffering
by providing a standard to eliminate the effect of jurors' differ-
ing conceptions of the value of money. Regression analysis has
the potential to make explicit latent value judgments about the
monetary value of specific categories of pain and suffering inju-
ries. The guidelines award would be the amount that a typical
jury would most likely award given the combinations of facts
and circumstances described in the guidelines for that award. If
jury value judgments are accepted as representations of commu-
nity values, the guidelines award can be said to reflect commu-
59. Id. at 216; see also Ingber, supra note 3 at 813; O'Connell & Simon, supra note 5,
at 5-6.
60. See G. CALABRESI, supra note 28, at 222-24; Ingber, supra note 3, at 803 n.150;
Zelermyer, supra note 35 at 41-42.
Although Zelermyer offered his reform long before sentencing guidelines had been con-
ceived, his proposal is similar to that offered in this Note. Zelermyer suggested the use of
a commission of doctors, lawyers and other experts to study the nature of pain and suf-
fering injuries in relation to the policies supporting recovery for such injuries. He pro-
posed that the commission provide a listing of the various types of injuries giving rise to
compensable pain and suffering, and a base figure to be used for "the compilation of a
schedule of graduated values arrived at through a study of comparative severity."
Zelermyer, supra note 38, at 42.
The key difference between the Zelermyer plan and the plan presented in this Note is
that the former would take the pain and suffering issue from the jury entirely. In con-
trast, the emphasis here is on promulgating guidelines according to social values by care-
fully studying jury behavior. The Zelermyer guidelines would be based primarily on the
values of the commission. The plan discussed in this Note would also give a large role to
the commission, but the commission would be directed to promulgate guidelines based,
to a significant extent, on the latent values of countless jurors who have decided pain
and suffering questions before. The promulgation of guidelines based on jury behavior is
important not only from the perspective of political accountability, but also from the
perspective of efficient accident avoidance. The latter depends upon an accurate assess-
ment of the communal perception of an injury's cost. Moreover, under this plan, juries
would continue to allocate pain and suffering awards in each case, but with the aid of the
guidelines.
61. P. ATIYAH, supra note 15, at 216.
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nity values."2 As a result, differences in awards between appar-
ently similar injuries might be attributed more confidently to
differences in the merits of the cases.
In addition to jurors' differing conceptions of the monetary
value of pain and suffering,6s jury decision making is subject to
the influence of extralegal facts (factors not legally relevant)
such as the race,6" sex," and the social" and physical attractive-
ness6 7 of the parties. It is hard to know if, when, and to what
extent extra-legal factors control the result in any particular
case."6
Multiple regression analysis can be used to lessen the influ-
ence of extralegal factors such as race and sex bias. Even if re-
62. The assertion that the guidelines awards will approximate community values
concerning the appropriate award for particular pain and suffering injuries is subject to
two qualifications.
First, the guidelines award will reflect jury consensus only to the extent that the equa-
tion on which the guidelines are based actually explains the variance between awards
within the particular categories of injuries comprising the sample data base. Thus, if the
injury category is back injury, and the regression equation accounts for 90% of the varia-
tion in amounts awarded for pain and suffering in previously decided back injury cases
studied by the guidelines commission, then the amount predicted by the equation should
represent community values concerning appropriate pain and suffering awards 90% of
the time. Presumably, the jury, as the community's representative, will choose to depart
from the guidelines in the 10% of the cases where the award does not reflect community
sentiment.
Second, an efficient market will reflect the value judgments of willing buyers and sell-
ers. Jurors, being neither the defendant, the "buyer," nor the injured party, the "seller,"
of a pain and suffering loss, have no incentive to reveal in their awards the amount that
they as individuals would demand to incur a similar injury. Thus, jury price valuations
are not of the same quality as a market valuation. Yet juries' pain and suffering awards
do reflect a judgment about what an injury "ought" to be worth, its reasonable worth.
This "ought" valuation is sufficient for efficient accident avoidance purposes. The pur-
pose of this Note is to suggest a means to clarify and make consistent this "ought"
valuation.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 18-28.
64. See Ugwuegbu, Black Juror's Personality Trait Attribution to a Rape Case De-
fendant, 4 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 194, 197-200; see also sources cited in McCleskey
v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 316-17, nn. 40-44.
65. Stephan & Tully, The Influence of Physical Attractiveness of a Plaintiff on the
Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 101 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 149, 149-50 (1977); see also
sources cited in McCleskey, supra note 64.
66. Izzett & Fishman, Defendant Sentences as a Function of Attractiveness and
Justifications for Actions, 100 J. Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 285, 287-289 (1976); see also sources
cited in McCleskey, supra note 64.
67. Kukla & Kessler, Is Justice Really Blind? - The Influence of Litigant Physical
Attractiveness on Juridical Judgment, 8 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 336, 374-77 (1978);
see also Izzett & Fishman, supra note 66, at 287-89.
68. Both intuition and inferences drawn from general knowledge about jury behavior
suggest that extralegal factors, including those listed above, control a great many pain
and suffering awards. Empirical research on jury behavior confirms that jury decisions
will be more influenced by extralegal factors when the legally relevant evidence is most
ambiguous. See Kaplan & Miller, A Model of Cognitive Processes in Jurors, 10 REPRE-
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search reveals that such factors as these are statistically relevant
to explain variations in pain and suffering awards, the guidelines
commission can elect, as a matter of policy, not to use these fac-
tors in formulating the guidelines. To the extent that such fac-
tors are eliminated, the guidelines awards will be less influenced
by extralegal factors.69 The guidelines, however, will have less
predictive power to the extent of the strength of the correlation
between extralegal factors and variations in pain and suffering
awards.70
C. Flexibility
Departures from the guidelines are permitted, and even en-
couraged, under appropriate circumstances. This feedback com-
ponent of the guidelines is significant in three ways: (1) it as-
sures that each plaintiff is given ample opportunity to receive
individualized consideration of her case; (2) it provides a check
on the "correctness" of newly issued guidelines; and (3) it per-
mits the guidelines to respond quickly to changes in public pol-
icy, the cost of living, or the consensus value of an injury.
The objective of the guidelines is to focus attention on the
facts of each case by solving, to a certain extent, the valuation
SENTATIVE RES. IN Soc. PSYCHOLOGY 48, 49 (1979); see also H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 50-51 (1966).
Evidence of the value of an item of damage is most ambiguous when there is no mar-
ket from which to infer reasonable levels of damages. Because there is no market for pain
and suffering, and because no other standards exist for assessing such damages, the op-
portunity for legally irrelevant considerations to control jury decisions is at its height. To
the extent that scheduled damages can be said to be less influenced by legally irrelevant
factors, the more likely it is that differences in amounts awarded can be attributed to
legitimate differences in the merits of the cases.
69. Even if such biases are eliminated, see infra note 70, it is still possible for extra-
legal biases to operate when juries score the guidelines or when they decide to depart
from them. Judicial review of pain and suffering awards under the guidelines offers the
best opportunity to lessen the influences of juror bias.
70. The researchers probably will not be able to remove ethically obnoxious factors
which are found to influence jury awards without reducing the predictive power of the
guidelines. Researchers will more likely be forced to decide whether to promulgate a
standard which includes the bias, one that does not, or some intermediate position.
If research reveals that white victims with a particular injury receive on the average
20% more for pain and suffering than do black victims with the same injury, the guide-
lines commission will have to decide whether to give everyone 20% more, 20% less, or
some amount in between. See NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RE-
SEARCH ON SENTENCING: THE SEARCH FOR REFORM 23 (1983).
The need to make this policy choice demonstrates that the use of descriptive guide-
lines does not eliminate the necessity of making essentially prescriptive policy choices in
guidelines formulation. Id. at 23-25.
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problem. This does not necessarily mean that factual issues are
taken from the jury. Factors that a particular plaintiff might
deem important to his case will not always have been included
in the data used to determine the guidelines. Nonetheless, the
parties will have ample opportunity to highlight these factors for
the jury.
The guidelines encourage the lawyers to argue about the as-
pects of the case that distinguish it from the typical case de-
scribed in the guidelines. The arguments should focus on factors
that either aggravate or mitigate the degree of injury, and call
for a greater or lesser award. 1 If the jury is convinced that ag-
gravating or mitigating factors are present, it should depart from
the guidelines. In this way, jury discretion is guided but not de-
termined by the schedules; the plaintiff is given sufficient oppor-
tunity to make the argument that her case is special.
Allowing the jury to depart from guidelines also provides a
check on the commission's work. When promulgating the initial
guidelines, or when updating the guidelines, the possibility ex-
ists that scheduled awards have missed the mark and bear too
little relation to what the typical jury would in fact do in the
average case. This fact would be made plain to the commission if
juries began systematically departing from the guidelines. The
commission would then correct its guidelines.
A flexible departure policy also permits the commission to re-
spond to changes in community values that should be reflected
in the jury decisions. For example, feedback data may reveal
that juries are consistently valuing the pain and suffering associ-
ated with a particular injury at an amount fifteen percent
greater than called for in the schedules. New schedules increas-
ing the relevant awards by fifteen percent could then be issued.
IV. PERSONALIZED JUSTICE AND JURY AUTONOMY
Pain and suffering guidelines may be perceived to challenge
two key precepts of the American justice system: the idea of per-
sonalized justice and the idea of jury autonomy. Fidelity to per-
sonalized justice requires that private legal disputes be deter-
mined in a vacuum, as though only the litigants bore an interest
in the outcome. The guidelines challenge this idea by limiting
the factors that juries may consider in awarding pain and suffer-
71. These factors should not already have been taken into account by the guidelines
nor should they have been factors expressly excluded from the guidelines.
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ing damages. This limitation is a by-product of guidelines based
on categories of factors deemed relevant in the typical case. Sim-
ilarly, the categorization process intrudes upon jury autonomy
by moving discretion now exercised by it to the political entities
responsible for the creation and maintenance of the guidelines.
The guidelines, however, do not unduly curtail personalized jus-
tice or jury autonomy. Rather, the guidelines force a considered
approach to the policy questions obscured by the present system
while better focusing jury decision making.
A. Personalized Justice
Opponents of scheduling for pain and suffering damages sug-
gest it is deindividualizing because it deprives the plaintiff of his
right to an award based on his individual suffering. Professors
Walter Blum and Harry Kalven Jr. articulate this concern:
A decision to include a significant dignitary component
makes the scheduling of damages a complex task. Let us
return again to our victim who has lost a leg and consider
the problem of scheduling appropriate damages which
will reflect the indignity to him. How many distinctions
would we wish to recognize? The differences between
men and women? Between adults and children? Between
old and young? Urban and rural? Athletic and seden-
tary? As we spin out these questions, we become aware
that in scheduling, one tends to decide against giving any
substantial weight to dignitary harm, without really con-
fronting the underlying policy issue. It is doubtful
whether, compensation plans apart, anyone would urge
making this change in damage law for its own sake.72
Blum and Kalven oppose scheduled damages because the latter
imposes closure upon the universe of information considered in
determining a damage award. Yet, the process of imposing clo-
72. W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, PUBLIC LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PRIVATE LAW PROBLEM:
AUTO COMPENSATION PLANS 36 (1965). It is important to place the professors' comments
in proper context. Their book is largely devoted to a discussion of tort theory in the
content of no-fault auto conpensation plans. Thus, when Professors Blum and Kalven
referred to scheduling, they may have had in mind schedules which would include dam-
ages for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary losses, the latter being referred to in the
quoted passage as "dignitary" harms. Nonetheless, the passage is referred to because it
states well both the practical and political arguments against scheduling pain and suffer-
ing damages.
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sure is significant because it requires that the most important
question be answered: what are the relevant factors that may be
used in determining damage awards?
If the guidelines are to have their intended effect, they cannot
take account of factors idiosyncratic to particular cases. Other-
wise, the "guidelines" will not be guidelines at all, but a series of
prescriptions for the resolution of particular cases. The object of
the salient factor analysis, to be conducted during the initial re-
search component of guidelines development, is to identify sta-
tistically the factors that exert the most influence on jury deci-
sion making. For the purpose of guideline development, these
are the relevant factors.
To the extent that the guidelines discourage jury considera-
tion of factors which might be relevant in a particular case, the
parties are denied personalized justice. This loss of personalized
justice in some cases may be a price worth paying to receive the
benefits of the guidelines.7" The system of guidelines proposed in
this Note, however, does not force an all or nothing choice be-
tween personalized justice and the benefits of guidelines. Where
legitimately relevant factors in a particular case have been ex-
cluded from the guidelines, the jury may depart from the guide-
lines and provide an appropriate award.
The process of guidelines development also compels a direct
response to an important normative question: which of the sta-
tistically relevant factors may be taken legitimately into account
by the guidelines? It is possible that initial research will reveal
that sex,7I race, 5 physical attractiveness of the parties or their
attorneys, 6 and judicial forum," exert a significant, statistically
independent influence on jury awards, controlling for other char-
acteristics of the case. A choice to exclude those factors from
consideration in guidelines formulation would sacrifice some of
the expected benefits, in terms of efficient accident avoidance, to
other public policies.
An objective of the guidelines, and part of their advantage, is
to force a considered approach to value conflicts arising during
the course of guidelines development. Research can provide only
73. G. CALABmRsI, supra note 28, at 307. Professor Calabresi would use "base" or "av-
erage" awards to schedule damages for pain and suffering. Beyond that point, the victim
would bear the most "highly individualized" losses. Id. at 224.
74. See sources cited supra note 65.
75. See sources cited supra note 64.
76. See sources cited supra note 67.
77. It is well known that urban juries tend to give more generous awards than rural
juries. See Blum, What's A Leg Worth? It Depends. Nat'l L. J., Aug. 1, 1988, at 1, 34.
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part of the answer, raw data; it does not suggest the proper use
of that data. The formation of categories and the choice of rele-
vant factors is a matter of policy. Which factors should be rele-
vant, as opposed to which factors are relevant, presents ques-
tions that must be confronted directly and openly.
B. Jury Autonomy
Blum and Kalven also raise implicitly the political question
that the choices necessitated by guidelines are better made ex-
clusively by the jury. The jury serves three purposes in Ameri-
can political life: to act as a credible fact finder; to inspire alle-
giance to the political system by permitting citizens to
participate directly in government; and to provide a check
against the excesses of institutionalized power.
The proposed system does not greatly interfere with these
purposes. First, a large role is maintained for the jury. The jury
retains its position as fact finder and is given authority to depart
from the guidelines. Moreover, its preferences will be influential
in determining the initial guidelines.
Second, the normative aspects of the categorization problem
raise issues that the jury is not presently asked to resolve. Issues
relating to evenhandedness across cases are traditionally within
the competence of other political institutions, namely the legis-
lature and the judiciary. If evenhandedness is valued in the ad-
ministration of justice, it is important that the issues raised by it
be addressed systematically.
If juries are permitted to depart from the guidelines at will,
the value of the guidelines will be lost. If, in contrast, juries are
never permitted to depart, a significant loss of personalized jus-
tice and jury autonomy will occur. The key role in balancing
these competing values belongs to the appellate courts.7
78. In many jurisdictions, trial courts deciding motions for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict have the authority to order remittitur or additur when awards are grossly
excessive or unreasonably inadequate. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 556-57 (1985). Generally, the courts have been quite reluctant to review dam-
age awards. When undertaken, the standard of review is narrow. As in criminal sentenc-
ing, an award will be overturned if it is deemed "monstrous" or if it "shocks the con-
science." See cases cited in Jaffe, supra note 5, at 232-33 nn.47 & 53.
The reluctance of courts to review damage average awards has been attributed to the
need to respect jury autonomy. Damages present factual questions, and judicial review of
jury findings would usurp the jury's proper authority. The sense that the inquiry necessi-
tated by review of jury awards is somehow unjudicial may spring from the realization
that judges have no principled bases for distinguishing between excessive or inadequate
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Appellate courts will have two functions when hearing appeals
from pain and suffering awards. One function will be to deter-
mine whether the jury properly scored the guidelines and thus
applied the correct presumptive award. A second function will
be to determine standards for departure from the guidelines.
At some point, departures from the guidelines should be sub-
ject to appellate review. The questions before the courts will be
(1) whether the reasons for departure79 are legally sufficient,80
and (2) given that the departure is justified, the extent to which
juries may depart. This latter question contemplates setting pa-
rameters. For instance, in the context of sentencing guidelines,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that, except in
extraordinary cases, the maximum sentence that Minnesota trial
judges may impose in cases of extreme aggravation is twice the
presumptive sentence provided in the guidelines.81
A collateral benefit of adopting guidelines is the opportunity
for further development of the law of damages. The use of ap-
pellate courts to police jury damage awards might be a depar-
ture from past conceptions of jury autonomy. In some cases, the
legal and factual questions presented will be hard to separate,
and to that extent appellate courts will be exercising new au-
thority. The guidelines system purposely engages three separate
decision makers-the jury, the commission, and the judici-
ary-in constant dialogue; each has an opportunity to shape the
debate and influence the outcome.
awards and reasonable awards. As Professor Dobbs has suggested, and Professor
Zelermyer has shown, courts ordering additur and remittitur are embarrassed to provide
satisfying reasons for their decisions. D. DOBBS, supra note 6, § 8.1, at 545; Zelermyer,
supra note 35, 31-33. Guidelines provide a norm for judges to apply. If guidance is pro-
vided, the role for appellate review outlined below may seem more judicial. See Jaffe,
supra note 5, at 221-22.
79. The need to have in the record the reasons for a departure raises the complicated
question of how to learn the reasons without chilling jury deliberation. One possible solu-
tion is to require juries to provide the reasons on the jury verdict form. Many jurisdic-
tions already provide juries with forms giving step-by-step guidelines to the deliberation
process. In the part of the form where juries indicate the amount of damages given for
pain and suffering, a second blank would be provided for juries departing from the
guidelines to give the reasons for so doing.
80. The appellate court would not inquire into the correctness of the jury's determi-
nation that particular factors exist or are absent. The sole question is whether the pres-
ence or absence of the factors provides a legally sufficient basis to allow departure.
81. State v. Evans, 311 N.W.2d 481, 483 (Minn. 1981).
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V. CONCLUSION
The current process for measuring pain and suffering damages
is seriously wanting; it is unprincipled both in theory and in
practice. The root difficulty with the present system is the lack
of a market for intangible losses such as pain and suffering; this
creates an opening for random factors, particularly inconsistent
conceptions of value, to distort damage awards. As a result, hori-
zontal equity, appropriate compensation, and efficient accident
avoidance are undermined.
This Note proposes a guideline system which emphasizes the
use of analytic techniques to predict or approximate the value of
particular injuries. The guidelines' departure and feedback sys-
tem permits sufficient flexibility to assure each plaintiff ample
opportunity to prove the special merits of her case. The guide-
lines and the departure policy also serve to facilitate appellate











XIV Life Sentence without Parole/Death Penalty
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SERIOUSNESS
SCORE OFFENDER SCORE
5 6 7 8 9 or more
XIV
XIII 28y 4m 30y 4m 32y 10m 36y 40y
291- 388 312 - 416 338 - 450 370 - 493 411 - 548
XII 17y 19y 21y 25y 29y
175 - 233 195 - 260 216 - 288 257 - 342 298 - 397
XI 9y 9m 12y 6m 13y 6m 15y 6m 17y 6m
100- 133 129 -171 139 - 185 159 -212 180 -240
X 7y 6m 9y 6m lOy 6m 12y 6m 14y 6m
77 -102 98- 130 108 - 144 129 -171 149 - 198
IX 5y 6m 7y 6m 8y 6m 10y 6m 12y 6m
57 -75 77 -102 87 -116 108 -144 129 - 171
VIII 4y 6m 6y 6m 7y 6m 8y 6m lOy 6m
46 -61 67 -89 77 -102 87 -116 108- 144
VII 4y 5y 6m 6y 6m 7y 6m 8y 6m
41 -54 57 -75 67 -89 77 -102 87 -116
VI 3y 6m 4y 6m 5y 6m 6y 6m 7y 6m
36 -48 46 -61 57 -75 67 -89 77 - 102
V 3y 2m 4y 5y 6y 7y
33-43 41-54 51-68 62-82 72-96
IV 2y 2m 3y 2m 4y 2m 5y 2m 6y 2m
22-29 33-43 43-57 53-70 63-84
20m 2y 2m 3y 2m 4y 2m 5y
17-22 22-29 33-43 43-57 51-68
16m 20m 2y 2m 3y 2m 4y 2m
14-18 17-22 22- 29 33-43 43-57
8m 13m 16m 20m 2y 2m
S 4-12 12+ - 14 14- 18 17-22 22-29
NOTE: Numbers represent presumptive sentence ranges in months. Midpoints are in
bold type (y = years, m - months). 12+ equals one years and one day. For a few
crimes, the presumptive sentences in the high offender score columns exceed the statu-
tory maximums. In these cases, the statutory maximum applies.
Additional time added to the presumptive sentence if the offender was armed with a
deadly weapon:
24 months (Rape 1, Robbery 1, Kidnapping 1)
18 months (Burglarly 1)
12 months (Assault 2, Escape, 1, Kidnapping 2, Commercial Burglarly 2)
* Tables reproduced from State of Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commis-
sion, Report to the Legislature 7-10 (1983).
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TABLE 2
CRIMES INCLUDED WITHIN EACH SERIOUSNESS
LEVEL
XIV Aggravated Murder 1
XIII Murder 1 (v) vf=fviolent offense (as defined by
RCW 9.94A)
XII Murder 2 (v)
XI Assault 1 (v)
X Kidnapping 1 (v)
Rape 1 (v)
IX Robery 1 (v)
Manslaughter 1 (v)
Statutory Rape 1 (v)
VIII Arson 1 (v)
Rape 2 (v)
Promoting Prostitution 1














Bribing a Witness/Bribe Received
by Witness
Malicious Harassment

















Intimidating a Public Servant
Tampering with a Witness
II Malicious Mischief 1





Possession of Stolen Property 2
Forgery
Auto Theft (Taking and Riding)
Vehicle Prowl 1
Eluding a Police Vehicle
Malicious Mischief 2
Reckless Burning
Unlawful Issuance of Bank Checks
NOTE: Drug crimes are not ranked at this time because they are still under
consideration by the Commission.
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